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Analyst coverage and future stock price crash risk 
Abstract:  
Purpose – Whether financial analysts play an effective role as information intermediaries and 
monitors has triggered a wide spread of debate among academics and practitioners to date. This 
study complements this debate by investigating the association between analyst coverage and 
firm-specific future stock price crash risk.  
Design/methodology/approach – Regression analysis is based on a large sample of U.S. 
public firms and the crash risk measure of Hutton et al. (2009). Potential endogeneity concerns 
are alleviated by (i) restricting the sample period to the post-Regulation-FD period and (ii) 
conducting an analysis of the impact threshold for a confounding variable method per Larcker 
and Rusticus (2010). 
Findings – Evidence reveals that a high level of analyst coverage is associated with lower 
future stock price crash risk. Further, the negative association between analyst coverage and 
stock price crash risk is stronger for firms that have high financial opacity. Additionally, analyst 
forecast pessimism is negatively associated with future crash risk.  
Originality/value – The findings of this study offer support for the view that analysts serve 
positive roles as information intermediaries and monitors in the US stock market.
Practical implications – This study is of interest to investors who seek analyst reports for their 
investment decision-making and for information providers who demand external financing. 
The findings of this study also have some other important implications for practitioners, given 
the economic and welfare consequences of stock price crashes. 
Keywords Analyst following, Stock price crashes, Information intermediary, Monitoring, 
Financial opacity
Paper type Research paper 
JEL Classification – G14, G29 
11. Introduction 
Financial analysts play two important roles in the financial marketplace. First, they act as 
information intermediaries between firm management and market participants. To this end, 
analysts acquire and process various value-relevant information, synthesize it in an 
understandable form, and disseminate it to the market; this improves information quality and 
increases the informational efficiency of stock markets. Second, analysts may also play a role 
as a monitor for a firm. By analyzing corporate information on a regular basis, analysts can 
scrutinize and interfere with management in a way that prevents it from pursuing suboptimal 
or value-destroying business activities. In uncovering and disseminating information to the 
public, analysts help investors detect and curb managerial misbehaviors.  
Whether and to what degree analysts in the U.S.’s capital markets fulfill their roles as 
information intermediaries and monitors is still inconclusive in the literature and warrants 
further research (Leuz, 2003; Frankel et al., 2006; Hansen, 2015). In respect of the information 
intermediary role, a large body of literature shows that financial analysts help boost stock price 
efficiencies (e.g., Barth and Hutton, 2004), reduce mispricing (e.g., Hong et al., 2000; Elgers 
et al., 2001; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002), increase stock liquidity (e.g., Roulstone, 2003; 
Balakrishnan et al., 2014), decrease information asymmetry among investors (Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1995), and lower cost of capital (e.g., Gebhardt et al., 2001; Gode and 
Mohanram, 2003; Bowen et al., 2008). 
 However, some research scholars (e.g., Elton and Gruber, 1972; Guerard and Beidleman, 
1986) question the effective role analysts act as information intermediaries. Empirical evidence 
reveals that analyst earnings forecasts fail to reflect the effects of conservative accounting 
(Mensah et al., 2004; Sohn, 2012) and of the transitory nature of current accruals (Elgers et al., 
2003). Kothari et al. (2009) show that analyst reports contain little information about risk and 
uncertainty. Furthermore, analysts with an incentive to generate trading commissions tend to 
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recommendations (e.g., Michaely and Womack, 1999; Dechow et al., 2000; Richardson et al., 
2004), especially when the investment bank with which analysts are affiliated has an 
underwriting relationship with the covered firm. Also, prior studies (e.g., Chan et al., 1996; 
Gleason and Lee, 2003) find evidence on market inefficiency with respect to analyst reports 
(i.e., the market’s under- or over-reactions to analyst reports); this lends further support to the 
notion that analysts do not unambiguously act an effective information intermediary role that 
promotes the informational efficiency of stock markets.  
Regarding analysts’ role as monitors, on one hand, a number of studies document that 
analysts play an effective governance role in constraining management malpractices, including 
accrual-based and real earnings management, excessive executive compensations, value-
destroying investments, and asset mismanagement (e.g., Yu, 2008; Jung et al., 2012; Irani and 
Oesch, 2013; Chen et al., 2015; Irani and Oesch, 2016), and as a result, future firm performance 
improves (e.g., Demiroglu and Ryngaert, 2010; Jung et al., 2012). On the other hand, evidence 
shows that analysts tend to issue biased forecasts and recommendations in the hope of currying 
favor with management for access to private information (e.g., Ke and Yu, 2006). As such, 
analysts may not have sufficient motivations to monitor managers in an effective manner, and 
therefore, the effectiveness of their role as monitors is questionable.  
To contribute to the inconclusive debate regarding whether analysts serve effective roles 
as information intermediaries and monitors for firms, we set out to investigate whether analyst 
coverage affects firm-specific future stock price crash risk (hereafters, crash risk). Crash risk 
refers to the likelihood of a sudden, drastic decline in stock price (Chen et al., 2001; Jin and 
Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009). With separation of ownership and control, managers have 
incentives to withhold bad news within a firm in order to secure private benefits (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). As bad news accumulates, the extent to which stock price is overvalued 
3increases, thus creating a stock price bubble. There exists a critical threshold at which it is too 
costly for management to withhold the accumulated bad news any longer. At such threshold 
point, all the bad news comes out at once, resulting in a stock price crash (Jin and Myer, 2006; 
Hutton et al., 2009). Hence, crash risk is closely bound up with both information opacity and 
agency conflicts. By examining the effect of analyst coverage on future crash risk, we can shed 
light on the effectiveness of analysts’ roles as information intermediaries and monitors. 
Our empirical analysis is conducted based on a sample of 29,419 firm-year observations 
for U.S. listed firms over the sample period of 1998-2013. Because stock price crash risk results 
from bad news being withheld and accumulated over extended periods (Jin and Myers, 2006; 
Hutton et al., 2009), one-year analyst coverage does not warrant a curb on future crash risk. 
Thus, we use the prior three years’ analyst coverage; this is in spirit of Hutton et al. (2009), 
who use the past three years’ moving sum of abnormal accruals as the measure of financial 
opacity when investigating its association with crash risk. We follow Hutton et al. (2009) to 
develop crash risk measures, which are based on the incidence, as well as frequency, of 
negative, extreme firm-specific weekly returns over a fiscal year. After controlling for a range 
of determinants of crash risk, we find that analyst coverage is significantly, negatively 
associated with future crash risk and that such association is more evident for firms with high 
financial opacity. These results support the view that analysts serve effective roles as 
information intermediaries and monitors for firms, and indicate that such roles played by 
analysts are more salient when firms have high financial opacity. 
We also examine whether conditional on analysts’ decision to cover a firm, analyst 
pessimism is related to future crash risk. If analysts are pessimistic in their earnings forecasts 
for a firm, then the firm does not need to, and thus has less incentive to, withhold bad news, if 
any, to meet or beat the pessimistic analyst forecasts that are relatively easier to meet or beat. 
What’s more, analysts’ pessimistic forecasts per se could accelerate the speed with which 
4corporate bad news is revealed to the public, hence decreasing future crash risk. Consistent 
with this reasoning, we find that analyst pessimism is negatively related to future crash risk. 
Our tests are subject to a concern that future crash risk is endogenously determined with 
analyst coverage and forecasts. To alleviate such a concern, we use lead-lag design and control 
for an extensive list of crash risk determinants and for industry-fixed and year-fixed effects in 
all the multivariate tests. On top of this, we adopt two approaches to alleviate further the 
endogeneity problem. First, we restrict our sample period to the post-Regulation-FD period, in 
which analysts are prohibited from accessing private information and thus are highly unlikely 
to self-select towards firms with lower anticipated crash risk. Second, following Larcker and 
Rusticus (2010), we conduct the impact threshold for a confounding variable method, whereby 
ensuring that our regression estimation is not driven by unobservable omitted variable(s). Our 
results are reasonably robust to using both approaches for controls of potential endogeneity.1
Our study makes two main contributions. First, we complement a vast literature that 
debates the effectiveness of financial analysts in serving information intermediary role in the 
financial marketplace. We provide evidence in support of the view (i) that financial analysts 
play an active information intermediary role in a way that increases information transparency 
of a firm and reduces its crash risk, and (ii) that analysts perform an effective monitoring role 
in a way that constrains firm management’s bad news hoarding activities and reduces future 
crash risk. By further showing supportive evidence that the informational and oversight roles 
played by analysts are more pronounced for more financially opaque firms, our study gives 
implications for investors who seek analyst reports for their investment decision-making.  
1 The exogenous events as to brokerage mergers and closures might be used in a natural experiment to 
address the potential endogeneity concerns. However, such events cause an exogenous decrease in analyst 
coverage only in the year in which the brokerage houses are merged or closed, whereas our analyst coverage 
measure, which is constructed in spirit of Hutton et al. (2009), pertains to a three-year measure. As such, 
using broker mergers and closures to identify one-year exogenous variation in analyst coverage does not 
work effectively in solving the endogeneity issues in our research context. Therefore, we rely mainly on the 
two identification strategies as described in the main body text.  
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risk. Building upon the bad-news-hoarding hypothesis, a large body of studies (e.g., Hutton et 
al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a, b; Callan and Fang, 2013; He, 2015; Andreou et al., 2017; Chang 
et al., 2017; He and Ren, 2018) have identified a variety of firm characteristics that determine 
stock price crash risk. Our research adds to this literature by documenting yet another important 
determinant of crash risk, which is analyst coverage.2
2. Hypothesis development
The fundamental cause of crash risk is bad news hoarding, which is driven by the extent of 
information opacity and agency conflicts (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009). Low 
corporate information transparency makes it difficult for outside investors to detect firm 
management’s misbehavior. Thus, managers in such firms are likely inclined to withhold bad 
news, leading to high crash risk for the firms. On the contrary, high information transparency 
restrains managerial bad news hoarding and thereby reduces the likelihood of future stock price 
crashes. Consistent with this notion, Hutton et al. (2009) find that firms with high financial 
opacity are more likely to experience stock price crashes. Building on Hutton et al. (2009), we 
posit that financial analysts, by means of their role as information intermediaries, can mitigate 
bad news hoarding within firms and reduce stock price crash risk. This is because financial 
2 Using a unique Chinese database, Xu et al. (2013) examine the association between analyst coverage and 
crash risk. Our research is different from Xu et al. (2013) in various aspects, including institutional setting, 
research motivation, story, and empirical findings. First, Xu et al. look at China’s emerging stock markets 
where analyst profession is still under-developed relative to that in the U.S.’s stock markets we look at in 
this paper. Second, unlike Xu et al., we motivate our research with the academic debate regarding whether 
analysts serve effective roles as information intermediaries and monitors, and aim at adding to this debate 
by virtue of our arguments and empirical analyses. Third, Xu et al. predict a positive association between 
analyst coverage and crash risk under a premise that analyst forecasts tend to be overly optimistic. They find 
results consistent with their prediction. However, we argue that analyst forecasts are highly unlikely to be 
generally optimistic, as optimistic analyst forecasts are more difficult for a firm to meet and beat. In U.S., 
analyst forecasts are in general pessimistic especially during the period leading up to earnings 
announcements (e.g., Ke and Yu, 2006). We show that analyst coverage is negatively associated with future 
crash risk through the effective role analysts serve as information intermediaries and monitors.  
6analysts, by virtue of their sophistication in acquiring and processing information, are likely to 
uncover bad news in a timely manner, and communicate this with investors through analyst 
research reports or media outlets. When bad news is impounded into stock prices timely, stock 
price crash risk will be reduced.  
Analysts’ monitoring role is another channel through which analyst coverage affects crash 
risk. If analysts can discipline management by actively monitoring and publicizing managerial 
actions, they act as monitors that decrease agency risk, reduce managerial malfeasances, and 
improve investment and operation decisions for a firm. As such, analysts, through their 
monitoring role, could reduce corporate bad news, deter managers from hoarding bad news, 
and thereby reduce crash risk for a firm.  
Taken together, provided that analysts fulfill their roles as information intermediaries and 
monitors, analyst coverage should lead to a more transparent information environment and a 
stronger monitoring mechanism for a firm, which limit management’s ability of concealing bad 
news, and ultimately, reduce the firm’s future crash risk. Nonetheless, if analysts fail to perform 
such effective informational and monitoring roles, we would not observe a negative association 
between analyst coverage and future crash risk. Based on the above discussion, we present our 
main hypothesis in a null form as follows: 
H1: Analyst coverage is unrelated to future stock price crash risk. 
3. Data and sample
Our tests are based on data collected primarily from I/B/E/S, CRSP, Compustat, and FactSet. 
Our sample period covers the years 1998-2013. We require that firms have necessary data from 
these databases to construct the variables of interest for our tests. To mitigate the effect of 
7potential outliers, we winsorize all the continuous variables at both the 1st and 99th percentiles.3
The final sample for testing the association between analyst coverage (analyst forecast 
pessimism) and future stock price crash risk is composed of 29,419 (11,685) firm-year 
observations for 7,488 (4,133) unique U.S. listed firms. Table 1 reports summary statistics of 
the variables used in the tests.  
We carry out a test of Spearman correlations for the independent variables used in the 
regression of future crash risk on analyst coverage (analyst forecast pessimism). In the results 
(not tabulated for brevity), the magnitudes of the correlations all fall short of 75%, indicating 
no multicollinearity arising should all these variables be included in the same regression. In 
un-tabulated analysis, we also run the variance inflation factors (VIF) test, and find that none 
of the variables have a VIF value higher than 5, which indicates that multi-collinearity is not 
an issue in our regression analyses (O’Brien, 2007).4
4. Research design and results
4.1 Test of H1: The association between analyst coverage and future stock price crash risk 
The following regression model is specified to test the relation between analyst coverage and 
future crash risk: 
crashriskt (ncrasht ) = a0 +a1anacovt-1 + a 2controlst-1 + e (1) 
Two crash risk measures are used. The first, crashriskt, is measured based on Hutton et al.
(2009), and equals 1 if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 
standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly return over the fiscal year t, and 0 
3 We also delete the observations that have the three-year analyst coverage higher than 1,500. Noticeably, 
one drawback of such winsorization or trimming is that it might undermine the economic meaning inherent 
in, and conveyed by, the variables (assuming no data-reporting error existing for the databases we 
use). Regarding this, we also re-do our empirical tests using samples that are not winsorized nor trimmed, 
and obtain qualitatively identical results.  
4 The largest VIF amounts to 3.05. Our results for the VIF test are not reported for parsimony and are 
available upon request.  
8otherwise.5 The second crash risk measure (ncrasht) equals the natural logarithm of 1 plus the 
frequency of negative, extreme firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year t. The 
measurement of the firm-specific weekly returns follows Kim et al. (2011a), with the returns 
all adjusted for market-wide factors.6 When crash risk is proxied by crashriskt (ncrasht), a logit 
(ordinary least squares (OLS)) regression is applied. The treatment variable, anacovt-1, equals 
the number of analysts that make at least one annual EPS forecast for a firm over a three-year 
period that ends at the end of the fiscal year t-1, and equals 0 if there is no analyst forecasting 
annual EPS for the firm. To cause a stock price crash, bad news should be not only withheld 
but also accumulated for extended periods until the amount of it reaches a critical threshold 
level. Therefore, one-year analyst coverage does not warrant a curb on crash risk, and thus we 
use the three-year measure for analyst coverage; this is in spirit to Hutton et al. (2009), who 
measure financial opacity by the three-year moving sum of absolute abnormal accruals when 
examining its relationship with crash risk. One red flag for earnings management is an 
abnormal level of positive accruals followed by a subsequent accruals reversal which takes 
negative. In this sense, both positive and negative abnormal accruals in the three-year period 
capture the extent of financial opacity for a firm. Hence, in calculating the opacity measure as 
the control for crash risk, we follow Hutton et al. to use the absolute value, rather than the 
signed value, of abnormal accruals for the three-year period.  
Based on prior research on crash risk (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et 
al., 2011a, b; Callan and Fang, 2013; He, 2015; Andreou et al., 2017; Chang et al., 2017; He 
and Ren, 2018), we control for firm size (size), return volatility (stdret), negative return 
skewness (ncskew), abnormal stock returns (meanret), return on assets (roa), abnormal trading 
5 All our statistically inferences remain unchanged if we re-define the negative, extreme firm-specific weekly 
returns as being lower than the mean firm-specific weekly return by 3, or 3.4, standard deviation.  
6 Considering the possibility that the financial crisis may still have some confounding effects on our crash 
risk measures, we exclude the crisis period (i.e., 2007-2008) from our sample period, and obtain qualitatively 
the same results for the hypothesis tests. 
9volume (tradevol), institutional ownership (insti), sales growth (salesgrowth), book-to-market 
ratio (btm), financial leverage (debt), stock market liquidity (liq), and financial opacity 
(opacity), and additionally, include industry-fixed and year-fixed effects in model (1).7 As with 
the treatment variable (anacov), all the control variables, which are defined in the appendix, 
have the measurement windows ending at the end of the fiscal year t-1; this lead-lag design, 
together with the inclusion of industry-fixed and year-fixed effects, helps mitigate potential 
endogeneity issues. In addition, we cluster the standard errors of the coefficients by firm to 
control for potential time-series correlations of residuals within firms (Petersen, 2009).8
Table 2 reports the regression results. Column (1) ((3)) presents the result of the logit 
(OLS) regression, in which crashrisk (ncrash) is used as the dependent variable for the full 
sample period. In both columns, the coefficients on anacov are negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Such results reject the null hypothesis, H1, suggesting that analyst 
coverage curbs bad news hoarding and mitigates crash risk.  
Analyst coverage and future crash risk might be endogenously determined by factors 
related to private corporate information. To cope with this concern, we restrict our sample to 
the post-Regulation-FD period in which insiders are not allowed to provide private information 
to analysts, and re-run regressions for model (1). Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2 report the 
results. The coefficients for anacov remain negative and highly significant, when crash risk is 
proxied by crashrisk and ncrash, respectively. A one-standard-deviation increase in anacov is 
associated with a decrease of 1.07% in the predicted likelihood of crashrisk. A one-standard-
deviation increase in anacov is associated with a decrease of 0.00779 in ncrash, which accounts 
7 As with prior research that investigates the effects of analyst coverage (e.g., Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen 
et al., 2015), we include firm size (size) as a key control in our multivariate tests. Though firm size (size) 
and analyst coverage (anacov) are strongly correlated, our variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics show that 
the VIF value for size is only 3.05, which is below 5. This suggests no multicollinearity associated with size
that would pose a threat to our empirical analysis (O’Brien, 2007). 
8 Our results remain qualitatively the same if we cluster the standard errors by industry for all our regression 
analyses.   
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for 5.72% of its sample mean. The results for the coefficients on the control variables are in 
general consistent with the prior literature.  
A plausible endogenous selectivity issue with our analysis is that analysts’ anticipation of 
future crash risk drives their current firm coverage decision. Nevertheless, crash risk is 
attributed to managers’ bad news hoarding which is unobservable to analysts who are restricted 
from accessing private information in the post-Regulation-FD era. As such, analysts’ ability to 
anticipate future crash risk is largely limited, thus substantially lowering the possibility that 
such analysts’ anticipation drives their current coverage decisions. Therefore, our results for 
the post-Regulation-FD sample period, as reported in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2, also 
mitigate the endogenous selectivity concern.  
4.2 The impact threshold for a confounding variable in the multivariate test of H1 
To further check whether our results, as shown in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2, are still 
subject to correlated-omitted-variables bias, we follow Larcker and Rusticus (2010) to conduct 
a test as to the impact threshold for a confounding variable (ITCV). The larger the value of 
ITCV, the less susceptible our regression results are to potential omitted-variables bias. Panel 
A (B) of Table 3 reports the results of the ITCV test for the regression, in which the dependent 
variable is crashrisk (ncrash) and that is run for the post-Regulation-FD period. We take the 
results in Panel A to illustrate how our regression results are not driven by the omitted-variables 
concern. None of the control varilables we include in our regression model has an impact with 
its absolute value higher than the absolute value of ITCV which is 0.0238. On this basis, it is 
very unlikely that an omitted variable has a higher correlation with crashrisk and anacov than 
do any of our control variables to overturn our result for anacov; this could be taken as strong 
11
evidence that our regression result of interest is immune from potential endogeneity concerns. 
The same conclusion could be drawn from the ITCV results in Panel B.9
4.3 A cross-sectional analysis of H1: The moderating effect of financial opacity on the 
association between analyst coverage and future crash risk 
To further test whether analyst coverage is more strongly, negatively associated with future 
crash risk for firms with high financial opacity, we split our full sample into two subsamples 
based on the sample median of the measure of financial opacity (i.e., opacity as per Hutton et 
al. (2009)), and then estimate model (1) separately for the two subsamples. Table 4 reports the 
results. For both the crashrisk and ncrash regressions, the coefficients for anacov are positive 
and highly significant for the high-financial-opacity subsample but are statistically 
insignificant for the low-financial-opacity subsample. This result indicates that the negative 
link between analyst coverage and future crash risk is more evident for firms with high financial 
opacity. 
4.4 Additional analysis: The association between analyst forecast pessimism and future stock 
price crash risk 
To test the relationship between analyst forecast pessimism and future crash risk, we replace 
anacov with pessimism in model (1), and derive the following model.  
                                       (2) 
We measure analyst forecast pessimism by the average of analysts’ annual EPS forecasts 
for a firm over a three-year period ending at the fiscal year t-1 (avgEPS). pessimismt-1 equals 1 
if the average figure, avgEPS, is below the lower sample quartile point, and 0 if avgEPS is 
9 We repeat the ITCV evaluation procedure for model (1) (as well as model (2) as described in Section 4.4) 
that is run for the whole sample period, and obtain the same conclusion that our results reported in Columns 
(1) and (3) of Table 2 (Table 5) are insensitive to potential correlated-omitted-variables bias.  
0 1 1 2 1(t t t tcrashrisk ncrash pessimism controls +α α α ε− −) = + +
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above the upper sample quartile point. crashriskt and ncrasht are as defined previously. We 
include the same control variables as we do in model (1). Column (1) ((3)) of Table 5 reports 
the logit (OLS) regression results for the full sample period of 1998-2013; Column (2) ((4)) 
presents the logit (OLS) regression results run for the post-Regulation-FD period only. In all 
sets of results, we find significantly negative coefficients on pessimism, thus supporting the 
notion that high analyst forecast pessimism is associated with lower future crash risk. For the 
post-Regulation-FD sample, a one-standard-deviation increase in pessimism is associated with 
a decrease of 1.32% in the predicted probability of crashrisk; a one-standard-deviation increase 
in pessimism is associated with a decrease of 0.0116 in ncrash, which is equivalent to 8.29% 
of the sample mean of ncrash.  
To assess the robustness of the results to potential correlated omitted variables, we repeat 
the ITCV evaluation procedure as we do in Section 4.2. In results not tabulated, we find an 
ITCV of -0.0226 (-0.0244) with its absolute value higher than all the absolute value of impact
for the crashrisk (ncrash) regression. Hence, our regression results reported in Table 5 are 
reasonably robust to potential correlated-omitted-variables bias.  
5. Conclusion
Whether the informational and monitoring roles played by financial analysts are effective has 
sparked widespread debate among academics and practitioners to date. We add to this debate 
by examining the association between analyst coverage and future stock price crash risk. Our 
results reveal that a high level of analyst coverage is associated with lower future crash risk, 
which lends support to the view that analysts serve positive roles as information intermediaries 
and monitors in the stock markets. Our results also show that the negative association between 
analyst coverage and future crash risk is stronger for firms with high financial opacity, 
suggesting that the roles played by analysts become more salient when firms are subject to high 
13
financial opacity. Our study is thus relevant to investors who seek analyst reports to aid in their 
investment decision-making. Given analysts’ effective information intermediary role as well 
as monitoring role in stock markets, information providers (particularly, accountants) may 
increase public disclosures of value-relevant information so as to enhance the quality and 
transparency of corporate information to its users and thereby facilitate external financing. Our 
findings also have some other important practical implications. Specifically, market 
participants can use analyst coverage to aid themselves in ex ante assessing future stock price 
crash risk, and therein assessing the likelihood and degree of insiders’ bad news hoarding which 
results in crash risk. This is of particular interest to investors for their portfolio investment 
decisions, and to suppliers and creditors who monitor the creditworthiness of their clients. 
Analyst coverage reduces crash risk via analysts’ role as information intermediaries and 
monitors. It is interesting to further test (i) whether and to what degree analyst coverage reduces 
crash risk via the information intermediary role, and (ii) whether and to what extent analyst 
coverage reduce crash risk via the monitoring role. However, the information intermediary role 
and monitoring role financial analysts play are interrelated and mutually reinforcing; 
specifically, by playing an active part in monitoring firm management, analysts may serve 
better as information intermediaries, and analysts’ serving an effective role as information 
intermediaries would in turn facilitate effective monitoring. It is difficult for an archival study 
to effectively disentangle the effects of the two distinct roles played by analysts. We thus leave 
this issue for future research in an experimental setting. 
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Appendix  
Variables Definitions 
crashrisk 1 if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 
standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly return over the fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. The firm-specific weekly returns measure follows Kim 
et al. (2011a). 
ncrash The natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of firm-specific weekly returns that 
fall 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly return over 
the fiscal year. The firm-specific weekly returns measure follows Kim et al. 
(2011a). 
anacov The number of analysts that make at least one annual EPS forecast for a firm 
over the recent three fiscal years, and 0 if there is no analyst forecasting annual 
EPS for the firm.  
pessimism 1(0) if the mean analyst EPS forecast (namely, avgEPS) is below (above) its 
lower (upper) sample quartile point. avgEPS is defined as the average of 
analysts’ annual EPS forecasts for a firm over the recent three fiscal years. 
ncskew  The negative skewness of firm-specific weekly stock returns over a 12-month 
period ending at the end of the fiscal year. 
debt Long-term debt plus short-term debt, divided by total assets for the fiscal year.
roa Return on assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
stdret The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over a 12-month period 
ending at the end of the fiscal year. 
insti Institutional investors’ stock ownership as a percentage of the outstanding 
shares for a firm at the end of the fiscal year. 
salesgrowth Sales revenues for the current fiscal year minus sales revenues for the previous 
fiscal year, scaled by sales revenues for the previous fiscal year.  
meanret The mean of firm-specific weekly return over a 12-month period ending at the 
end of the fiscal year. 
size The natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s equity at the end of the 
fiscal year. 
btm The book value of firm equity divided by the market value of firm equity at the 
end of the fiscal year. 
tradevol The monthly trading volume, divided by the number of outstanding shares at 
the end of the month, and averaged over the fiscal year for a firm. 
liq A liquidity measure constructed as per Fang et al. (2009). It is calculated as the 
average of daily relative effective spread for the PBE announcement quarter. 
The daily relative effective spread is calculated as the absolute value of the 
difference between the transaction price and the midpoint of the prevailing bid-
ask quote, divided by the midpoint of the prevailing bid-ask quote. 
opacity The three-year moving sum of the absolute value of abnormal accruals for the 
current and previous two fiscal years, a measure of financial opacity developed 
by Hutton et al. (2009). 
19
 Table 1  Summary statistics 
Notes: This table tabulates descriptive statistics of all the variables used for the multivariate tests. The sample period for the crash risk 
measures spans the years 1998-2013. All the variables are defined in the appendix. 
Variables N Mean Std Min. 25% Median 75% Max. 
Key variables 
crashrisk 29,419 0.1745 0.3795 0 0 0 0 1 
ncrash 29,419 0.1292 0.3058 0 0 0 0 3.8918 
anacov 29,419 100.3452 139.5935 0 9 49 136 1343 
avgEPS 23,371 0.9939 1.7809 -5.8622 0.2858 0.7533 1.4492 11.0456 
pessimism 11,685 0.5000 0.5000 0 0 1 1 1 
Control variables 
roa 29,419 -0.0201 0.2271 -1.5979 -0.0166 0.0319 0.0708 0.2722 
size 29,419 5.9701 2.0704 1.2671 4.5262 6.0617 7.3719 10.9121 
stdret  29,419 0.0737 0.0470 0.0106 0.0424 0.0609 0.0901 0.2883 
btm 29,419 2.5787 8.5759 0.0411 0.3293 0.5950 1.0982 59.7229 
ncskew 29,419 4.2554 14.6503 -70.5999 -2.7759 4.1476 11.0478 58.4554 
meanret 29,419 0.2665 1.2629 -5.1931 -0.2809 0.2904 0.8492 4.9159 
opacity 29,419 10.8456 49.3328 0 0.0331 0.1389 0.7882 356.6239 
salesgrowth 29,419 0.1734 0.6632 -0.9141 -0.0528 0.0723 0.2249 5.3975 
tradevol 29,419 1.5651 1.6071 0.0367 0.5038 1.0542 2.0381 9.2068 
debt 29,419 0.1963 0.1974 0 0.0008 0.1558 0.3323 0.9104 
insti  29,419 0.9996 1.3504 0 0 0.2051 1.7920 4.4662 
liq 29,419 0.0184 0.0293 0.0003 0.0016 0.0072 0.0215 0.1657 
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Table 2   Multivariate test of the association between analyst coverage and future stock price 
crash risk 
Variables crashrisk ncrash 
Full sample 
period 
Post Regulation FD 
period 
Full sample 
period 
Post Regulation FD 
period 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
anacov -0.0004** -0.0005*** -0.00004** -0.0001*** 
(-2.572) (-2.700) (-2.150) (-2.705) 
roa 0.7461*** 0.7302*** 0.0467*** 0.0593*** 
(7.461) (6.688) (3.332) (4.059) 
size 0.0918*** 0.0920*** 0.0083*** 0.0093*** 
(6.159) (5.268) (5.271) (5.064) 
stdret 5.9554*** 7.4409*** 0.9511*** 1.1377*** 
(11.311) (11.044) (12.776) (11.597) 
btm -0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0001 0.00003 
(-1.023) (-0.735) (-0.516) (0.139) 
ncskew -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(-1.453) (-1.253) (-1.414) (-1.345) 
meanret -0.4173*** -0.4393*** -0.0459*** -0.0507*** 
(-27.376) (-22.868) (-20.732) (-17.698) 
opacity 0.0005 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 
(1.628) (1.236) (1.434) (1.229) 
salesgrowth -0.0347 -0.0105 -0.0061** -0.0018 
(-1.324) (-0.339) (-1.990) (-0.464) 
tradevol -0.0163 0.00005 -0.0021 -0.0007 
(-1.318) (0.004) (-1.530) (-0.445) 
debt -0.0780 -0.2692** -0.0060 -0.0230* 
(-0.792) (-2.289) (-0.546) (-1.784) 
Insti 0.0843*** 0.0834*** 0.0112*** 0.0105*** 
(4.733) (4.505) (5.540) (5.000) 
liq -1.8731* -6.4535*** 0.0472 -0.3577** 
(-1.912) (-3.870) (0.421) (-2.218) 
Intercept -2.4415*** -2.7724*** -0.0181 -0.1267*** 
(-9.846) (-9.571) (-0.118) (-7.671) 
Pseudo R2/adj. R2 0.0687 0.0714 0.0543 0.0603 
Observations 29,419 21,270 29,419 21,270 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the test of the association between analyst coverage and future stock price 
crash risk. Column (1) reports the results for the logit regression, in which crashrisk is the dependent variable, and that is run 
for the full sample period of 1998-2013. Column (2) reports the results for the logit regression, in which crashrisk is the 
dependent variable, and that is run for the post-Regulation-FD period (i.e., 2001-2012 (2002-2013) for the anacov (crashrisk) 
measure). Column (3) reports the results for the OLS regression, in which ncrash is the dependent variable, and that is run for 
the full sample period of 1998-2013. Column (4) reports the results for the OLS regression, in which ncrash is the dependent 
variable, and that is run for the post-Regulation-FD period. All the variables used in the regressions are defined in the appendix. 
Industry dummies (constructed based on the first two digits of SIC codes) and year dummies are included in the regressions 
but are not reported for brevity. The t/z statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, 
* denote the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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Table 3  Impact threshold for a confounding variable for the test of the association between analyst coverage and future crash risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A ITCV ITCV implied 
correlations 
ρ(x, anacov|z) ρ(x, crashrisk|z) Impact ρ(x, anacov) ρ(x, crashrisk) Impactraw
anacov -0.0238 0.1543
roa -0.0776 0.0335 -0.002600 0.1455 0.0133 0.001935 
size 0.5309 0.0188 0.009981 0.6396 0.0490 0.031340 
stdret 0.0286 0.0815 0.002331 -0.1918 0.0520 -0.009974 
btm 0.0247 -0.0089 -0.000220 -0.1435 -0.0456 0.006544 
ncskew -0.0228 -0.0087 0.000198 -0.1304 -0.0195 0.002543 
meanret 0.0592 -0.1809 -0.010709 0.0196 -0.1840 -0.003606 
opacity 0.0044 0.0147 0.000065 -0.0347 0.0126 -0.000437 
salesgrowth -0.0629 0.0031 -0.000195 -0.0243 0.0216 -0.000525 
tradevol 0.2952 -0.0143 -0.004221 0.4136 0.0357 0.014766 
debt -0.0080 -0.0321 0.000257 0.0333 -0.0411 -0.001369 
insti 0.1865 0.0494 0.009213 0.4522 0.0564 0.025504 
liq 0.1965 -0.0269 -0.005286 -0.3083 -0.0543 0.016741 
Mean 0.0962 -0.0059 -0.000099 0.0726 -0.0087 0.006955 
Max 0.5309 0.0815 0.009981 0.6396 0.0564 0.031340 
 Panel B ITCV ITCV implied 
correlations 
ρ(x, anacov|z) ρ(x,  ncrash|z) Impact ρ(x, anacov) ρ(x, ncrash) Impactraw
anacov -0.0222 0.1490 
roa -0.0776 0.0214 -0.001661 0.1455 -0.0110 -0.001601 
size 0.5309 0.0164 0.008707 0.6396 0.0253 0.016182 
stdret 0.0286 0.0921 0.002634 -0.1918 0.0778 -0.014922 
btm 0.0247 -0.0077 -0.000190 -0.1435 -0.0419 0.006013 
ncskew -0.0228 -0.0084 0.000192 -0.1304 -0.0159 0.002073 
meanret 0.0592 -0.1790 -0.010597 0.0196 -0.1816 -0.003559 
opacity 0.0044 0.0150 0.000066 -0.0347 0.0133 -0.000462 
salesgrowth -0.0629 0.0014 -0.000088 -0.0243 0.0199 -0.000484 
tradevol 0.2952 -0.0160 -0.004723 0.4136 0.0283 0.011705 
debt -0.0080 -0.0263 0.000210 0.0333 -0.0371 -0.001235 
insti 0.1865 0.0473 0.008821 0.4522 0.0401 0.018133 
liq 0.1965 -0.0164 -0.003223 -0.3083 -0.0288 0.008879 
Mean 0.0962 -0.0050 0.000012 0.0726 -0.0093 0.003394 
Max 0.5309 0.0921 0.008821 0.6396 0.0778 0.018133 
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Notes: This table reports the impact of possible correlated omitted variables on the results for the multivariate test of the association between analyst coverage and future crash risk for the post- 
Regulation-FD period. Panel A (B) shows the results of the impact threshold test for the regression in which crashrisk (ncrash) is the dependent variable. Column (1) reports the impact threshold 
for a confounding variable (ITCV), which is the lowest product of the partial correlation between the dependent variable (i.e., crashrisk for Panel A and ncrash for Panel B) and the confounding 
variable and the partial correlation between the treatment variable and the confounding variable that causes the coefficient for anacov to be statistically insignificant. Column (2) reports the implied 
minimum correlation a confounding variable must have with the dependent variable and anacov to make the coefficient for anacov statistically insignificant. Column (3) reports the partial 
correlations between anacov and each control variable in our regression model (1). Column (4) presents the partial correlations between the dependent variable and each control variable in our 
regression model (1). Column (5) is each control variable’s partial impact, which is defined as the product of the two partial correlations that are reported in Column (3) and Column (4), respectively. 
Column (6) presents the raw correlations between anacov and each control variable in our regression model (1). Column (7) reports the raw correlations between the dependent variable and each 
control variable in our regression model (1). Column (8) shows each control variable’s raw impact, which is defined as the product of the two raw correlations that are reported in Column (6) and 
Column (7), respectively. 
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Table 4  Multivariate test of the moderating effect of financial opacity on the association between 
analyst coverage and future stock price crash risk 
Variables crashrisk ncrash 
High opacity Low opacity High opacity Low opacity
        (1)       (2)      (3)      (4) 
anacov -0.0007*** -0.0004 -0.0001** -0.00002 
(-2.878) (-1.301) (-2.471) (-0.702) 
roa 0.7354*** 0.8874*** 0.0534*** 0.0294 
(7.216) (3.921) (4.826) (1.424) 
size 0.1084*** 0.0801*** 0.0103*** 0.0069*** 
(5.489) (3.783) (4.520) (3.304) 
stdret 6.7207*** 5.3349*** 1.0517*** 0.8520*** 
(10.591) (7.030) (14.412) (11.414) 
btm -0.0003 -0.0047 0.0001 -0.0002 
(-0.079) (-1.383) (0.220) (-0.842) 
ncskew -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0002 
(-0.954) (-1.028) (-0.784) (-0.965) 
meanret -0.4039*** -0.4510*** -0.0450*** -0.0482*** 
(-21.631) (-19.818) (-21.876) (-22.775) 
salesgrowth -0.0506* 0.0335 -0.0082** 0.0017 
(-1.812) (0.612) (-2.489) (0.313) 
tradevol -0.0194 -0.0072 -0.0020 -0.0019 
(-1.240) (-0.369) (-1.066) (-0.996) 
debt -0.3075** 0.1471 -0.0320** 0.0164 
(-2.332) (1.057) (-2.134) (1.189) 
insti 0.1022*** 0.0727*** 0.0139*** 0.0091*** 
(4.386) (2.973) (4.850) (3.559) 
liq -2.1479 -1.7888 0.0761 0.0048 
(-1.637) (-1.364) (0.565) (0.040) 
Intercept -2.2884*** -3.1877*** 0.2623 -0.0326 
(-8.134) (-5.463) (1.176) (-0.200) 
Pseudo R2/adj.R2 0.0748 0.0688 0.0546 0.0551 
Observations 14,709 14,710 14,709 14,710 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the test of the moderating effect of financial opacity on the association 
between analyst coverage and future stock price crash risk. The sample period for the crash risk measures ranges from 1998-
2013. Column (1) ((2)) reports the results for the logit regression, in which crashrisk is the dependent variable, and that is run 
for the subsample whose observations have the values of opacity higher (lower) than the full sample median. Column (3) ((4)) 
reports the results for the OLS regression, in which ncrash is the dependent variable, and that is run for the subsample whose 
observations have the values of opacity higher (lower) than the full sample median. All the variables used in the regressions 
are defined in the appendix. Industry dummies (constructed based on the first two digits of SIC codes) and year dummies are 
included in the regressions but not reported for brevity. The t/z statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. *** and ** denote the statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5  Multivariate test of the association between analyst forecast pessimism and 
future stock price crash risk 
Variables crashrisk ncrash 
Full sample period Post Regulation FD period  Full sample period 
Post Regulation 
FD period 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
pessimism -0.1989*** -0.1882** -0.0273*** -0.0232** 
(-2.642) (-2.096) (-3.129) (-2.347) 
roa 0.6193*** 0.6144*** 0.0504*** 0.0653*** 
(4.634) (4.078) (3.117) (4.180) 
size 0.0635*** 0.0646** 0.0055** 0.0059** 
(3.009) (2.556) (2.406) (2.025) 
stdret 6.9466*** 8.5256*** 1.0216*** 1.2055*** 
(8.296) (8.072) (8.535) (8.243) 
btm -0.0052 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001 
(-1.219) (-0.063) (-1.158) (0.320) 
ncskew -0.0011 -0.0028 -0.0001 -0.0003 
(-0.566) (-1.280) (-0.356) (-1.383) 
meanret -0.4105*** -0.4416*** -0.0467*** -0.0519*** 
(-18.453) (-15.282) (-14.665) (-12.752) 
opacity -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.00005 -0.0001 
(-0.406) (-1.018) (-0.847) (-1.379) 
salesgrowth -0.0380 -0.0066 -0.0035 0.0014 
(-1.071) (-0.159) (-0.794) (0.232) 
tradevol -0.0241 -0.0045 -0.0027 -0.0014 
(-1.337) (-0.231) (-1.331) (-0.658) 
debt -0.1275 -0.4279** -0.0124 -0.0321 
(-0.862) (-2.471) (-0.720) (-1.563) 
insti 0.0576** 0.0649** 0.0079*** 0.0086*** 
(2.136) (2.280) (2.670) (2.710) 
liq -3.4821 -6.7939* 0.1453 -0.0500 
(-1.631) (-1.816) (0.533) (-0.104) 
Intercept -1.7706*** -2.1916*** 0.0607** 0.4131*** 
(-4.958) (-5.467) (2.045) (9.706) 
Pseudo R2/adj. R2 0.0799 0.0821 0.0653 0.0697 
Observations 11,685 8,596 11,685 8,596 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the test of the association between analyst forecast pessimism and future 
stock price crash risk. Column (1) reports the results for the logit regression, in which crashrisk is the dependent variable, and 
that is run for the full sample period of 1998-2013. Column (2) reports the results for the logit regression, in which crashrisk
is the dependent variable, and that is run for the post-Regulation-FD period (i.e., 2001-2012 (2002-2013) for the anacov
(crashrisk) measure). Column (3) reports the results for the OLS regression, in which ncrash is the dependent variable, and 
that is run for the full sample period of 1998-2013. Column (4) reports the results for the OLS regression, in which ncrash is 
the dependent variable, and that is run for the post-Regulation-FD period. All the variables used in the regressions are defined 
in the appendix. Industry dummies (constructed based on the first two digits of SIC codes) and year dummies are included in 
the regressions but not reported for brevity. The t/z statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by 
firm. ***, **, * denote the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
